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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

CaseNo.10031.

LEi\ 0 ~ 1:\RTINEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The appellant, Leno Martinez, was convicted upon jury
trial in the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County,
State of Utah, of the crime of burglary.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
An information charging the appellant with the crime
of burglary in the second degree was filed December 17,
1962. On the 27th day of December, 1962, the appellant,
through his counsel, Norman B. Hendricks, filed a motion
for a continuance for time to enter a plea. The continuance
was granted. On January 8, 1963, the defendant, in the
presence of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, various preliminary steps were taken. On March 12,
1963, notice of a trial setting in the case for April16, 1963,
was sent to counsel for the defendant. An amended notice
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of trial setting on March 19th was sent to counsel, setting
trial for March 27th. At the time set for trial the defendant
was tried by jury and convicted. He was represented by
counsel other than the counsel who had first represented
him. A motion for new trial was filed on April1, 1963, and
on May 28, 1963, the motion for new trial was denied and
the defendant committed to the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits the decision of the District Court
should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of facts
in addition to those stated in the brief of the appellant, but
concedes the accuracy of the facts stated in the appellant's
brief only to the extent they appear in the record on appeal.
On the 13th day of December, 1962, a complaint was
issued in the City Court of Ogden City, charging the defendant with the crime of burglary in the second degree.
Preliminary hearing was waived on December 14, 1962 by
the defendant and he was admitted to bail. On December
17th, an information was filed by the District Attorney
charging the defendant with second degree burglary, and
the court appointed Ralph Raat, Esq., to represent the defendant (R. 2, 3). On December 24, 1962, the appellant
was brought before the court for arraignment ( R. 6). Mr.
Raat had withdrawn and the appellant was represented by
Norman B. Hendricks, Esq. The case was continued pursuant to defense motion to allow the defendant to enter a
plea. On January 8, 1963, the appellant entered a plea of
not guilty and the matter was set down for trial (R. 8). On
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the same day a drmand for a bill of particulars was filed
and a motion to suppress evidence (R. 9, 10). Notice of
trial setting was mailed to Mr. Norman Hendricks, the appellant's counsel, on the 11th and 19th day of March ( R.
14, 15). On the 27th day of March, the date set for trial,
the defendant appeared in court represented by Gordon
Hoxsie. Mr. Hoxsie indicated that Mr. Hendricks had
withdrawn and moved the court for additional relief (R.
17).
The appellant moved the court for permission to change
his plea to not guilty by reason of insanity, which the court
denied (R. 17-A). The court indicated that the defendant
could bring out on direct examination of his client any issue
of sanity and present the matter to the jury (R. 17-A).
Thereafter trial was held and the appellant was found
guilty ( R. 20) .
On Aprill, 1963, a motion for new trial was filed by the
appellant on the grounds that the trial court erred in not
allowing a change of plea to not guilty by reason of insanity
and newly discovered evidence (R. 22). On May 28, 1963,
the court heard the motion for a new trial. In support of
the motion for new trial, two letters were considered by the
court (R. 30, 38). The first was a letter from Ernest G.
Beier, a psychologist, as to the results of psychological tests
given to the appellant. The second was a letter from Dr.
Charles E. Parmalee as to an examination performed on the
appellant. In the letter of Dr. Parmalee, he indicates that
he first saw the appellant when requested to do so by Norman Hendricks, appellant's previous attorney, on December 26, 1962. In neither of the letters does either person conclude that the appellant did not understand the nature of
the act he did, or not know that the act was wrong, or that
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he was in anyway prohibited from adhering to the right
( R. 30, 38) . Neither of the letters presented were in affidavit form. The trial court overruled the appellant's motion for new trial.
In the appellant's brief, page 7, there is a letter dated
December 18, 1963, from Dr. Parmalee to Judge Foley of
the Federal District Court of Nevada, referring to a federal
criminal charge against the appellant. This letter was not
received or considered by the trial court on the motion for
new trial, nor does it appear to have been offered. In that
letter, however, the Doctor notes that he had first examined
the appellant on December 26, 1962, at the request of Norman Hendricks, appellant's counsel. A comparison of the
letter of Dr. Parmalee, dated December 18, 1963, to Judge
Foley, and the letter presented to Judge Jones at the time of
the motion for new trial, indicates that the diagnosis was
generally the same. Again, the letter to Judge Foley does
not indicate whether or not the Doctor is of the opinion the
appellant was legally insane.
No notice pursuant to 77-22-16, U.C.A. 1953, was filed
by the appellant indicating that he intended to raise a defense of insanity. Additionally, it should be noted that the
record on appeal does not contain a transcript of the proceedings before the trial court, but merely contains the particular pleadings filed and minute entries of what occurred.
The nature of the evidence, the arguments made and the
reasons for the rulings do not appear from the record.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
DENYIN(; THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ALLOW A
CHAN<;E OF PLEA OF NOT GUILTY TO ONE OF NOT
GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY, SINCE A PLEA OF
NOT GUlLTY BY REASON OF INSANITY IS UNKNOWN
TO UTAH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, NOR DID THE TRIAL
COURT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR A CONTINUANCE.

In Point I of the appellant's brief he contends that the
trial court erred in not allowing a change of plea from not
guilty to not guilty by reason of insanity. It is submitted that
the trial court committed no error in this regard since there
is no provision in Utah law for a plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity. 77-24-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"There are four kinds of pleas to an indictment or information:
(1) Guilty.
(2) Not guilty.
(3) A former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the offense charged.
(4) Once in jeopardy.
A defendant who does not plead guilty may enter one or more of
the other pleas."

The only provisions in the Utah Code providing for a
restriction upon the defense of insanity are those which require that notice of a proposed defense of insanity be given
prior to the time of trial. Thus, 77-22-16, U.C.A. 1953,
provides:
"Whenever a defendant shall propose to offer in his defense evidence that he is not guilty by reason of insanity, such defendant
shall at the time of the arraignment, or within ten days thereafter
but not less than four d~ys before the trial of such cause, file and
~rve upon the prosecuting attorney in such cause, notice in writmg of his intention to claim such defense. If the defendant fails
to file such notice, he shall not be entitled to introduce evidence
tending to establish such defense. The court may, however, per-
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mit such evidence to be introduced where good cause for the failure to file notice has been made to appear."

In the instant case the record does not reflect that the
appellant filed any notice of an intention to raise the defense
of insanity within the time required by statute. The court's
duty to appoint alienists to examine the defendant is based
upon prior notice of the defense of insanity being given to
the court. 77-24-17, U.C.A. 1953. The trial court, therefore, acted correctly in not accepting any change of plea
since a plea of not guilty could raise the defense of insanity
were notice of insanity timely filed. Further, it is well settled
that the failure to file timely notice will, in the discretion of
the trial court, preclude the receipt of evidence based upon
the defense of insanity.
In 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 449, p. 1264, it is stated
with reference to statutes requiring that notice be given of
the defense of insanity:
"Where an accused fails to give notice at the time required, he has
no absolute right to avail himself of the insanity defense, although
the court may, in its discretion for just cause shown, permit him to
do so."

In State v. Wallace, 170 Ore. 60, 131 P.2d 222 (1942),
the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a similar provision of
Oregon law, ruling that it was a legitimate exercise of procedural power. The court stated:
"The foregoing authorities establish that the Oregon statute, insofar
as it requires notice of purpose to present the insanity defense, is
valid. Counsel for the defendant recognized and the authorities
also demonstrate that the statute was applicable to the case at bar
and that the only question is whether the trial court abused its
discretion. No such abuse appears from the record. No question
was ever asked concerning the defendant's ability to distinguish
between right and wrong or concerning his previous or subsequent
mental condition.***"
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See also People v. Nolan, 126 Cal. App. 623, 14 P.2d 880;
Pt~ople v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 273 Pac. 767; People v.
LfoTZg Fook, ~06 Cal. 64, 273 Pac. 779.

:\ similar result was reached by the Arizona court in
State v. Reid, 87 Ariz. 123, 348 P.2d 731 ( 1960), where the
court ruled that the failure to give timely notice of the defense of insanity precluded the defendant from claiming
that it was error for the trial court not to allow the presentation of evidence on the issue.
In People v. Nolan, 126 Cal. App. 623, 14 P.2d 880,
the California court was faced with a situation almost identical to that in the instant case and the court ruled that there
was no basis for a claim of error. In doing so the court noted
that the case had been pending for some months before trial
and had been delayed in one instance at the request of the
appellant.
Even so, however, in the instant case Judge Jones indicated that the defendant could present any evidence on the
insanity issue he desired ( R. 17). Further, the record clearly
demonstrates that counsel for the appellant had ample time
within which to file a notice of a plea of insanity.
In December, 1962, appellant's counsel, Norman Hendricks, had had the appellant examined by a psychiatrist.
Consequendy, in 1963, at the time he assumed the defense
in the instant case, he was well aware of any claims to the
appellant's mental condition. Being so advised, counsel,
had he felt it worthwhile, could well have filed timely notice
of the defense of insanity. Since the plea which the appellant sought to impose is improper, he can claim no error on
that basis, nor can the appellant claim error in denying him
a continuance since, as noted above, a continuance for the
purposes of raising the defense of insanity was a matter
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within the sound discretion of the court since no timely
notice four days prior to the time when trial was set was
filed, even though counsel then representing the appellant
had timely notice of the date of the trial and had notice of
the mental condition of the appellant.
Finally, there would be no error in the court refusing
to grant the appellant a continuance. The case had been
pending for some time. The record is completely silent as to
the basis upon which the appellant sought to justify his continuance, the reasons for withdrawal of prior counsel and
the extent of preparation that counsel who handled the case
at trial had made, and whether there had been any consultation with the previous counsel.
In State v. Mathis, 7 U.2d 100, 319 P.2d 134 (1957),
this court noted :
"The request for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court and unless there is plain abuse its ruling will not be
disturbed. * * *"

This court has repeatedly followed the rule that the trial
judge will only be held to have erred if in exercising his
discretion he went beyond the bounds of reason and thus
denied the accused an opportunity for a fair trial. State v.
Fairclough, 86 Utah 326, 44 P.2d 692 ( 1935); State v.
Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 ( 1936); State v. Hartman, 101 Utah 298, 119 P.2d 112 ( 1941); State v. Williams, 49 Utah 320, 163 Pac. 1104 ( 1917); State v. Cano,
64 Utah 87, 228 Pac. 563 ( 1924); State v. Anselmo, 46
Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071 ( 1915). This is the rule of general application in this country, and the courts have ruled
that this is true even where the claim of insufficient time
for preparation is made. Prescott v. State, 56 Okl. Cr. 259,
37 P.2d 830 ( 1934); State v. Badgley, 140 Kan. 349, 37
P.2d 16 ( 1934).
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In Statr u. McQueen, 14 U.2d 311, 383 P.2d 921
( 1963), a continuance was requested where counsel had
lwt~n appointed to represent the defendant only one and
one-half days prior to trial. However, it appeared that pre\'ious counsel had been retained some months before and
had consulted with counsel at the time of trial. The court
noted that the question of continuance was within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and ruled that there was no
abuse of discretion.
Finally, it should be observed that since the appellant
has not brought before the court a complete record of what
transpired at the time the motion for continuance was
made, it must be presumed that the trial court had sufficient
basis to support its judgment. Watkins v. Simonds, 14 U.2d
406, 385 P.2d 154 ( 1963) ; Baine v. Beckstead, 10 U.2d 4,
347 P.2d 554 (1959); johnson v. People's Finance and
Thrift Company, 2 U.2d 246, 272 P.2d 171 ( 1952).
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN DENYI~G

THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

The appellant assigns as error the failure of the trial
court to grant a new trial. Once again the record does not
disclose in specific detail the arguments of the parties or the
basis upon which the court acted in denying a new trial.
The appellant apparently takes the position that the court
should have granted a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. 77-38-3 (7), U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"When new evidence has been discovered, material to the defendant and which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial."

In addition, the before referenced section also provides:
.. ,~·hen a motion for a new trial is made upon the ground of newly
dtscovered evidence, the defendant must produce at the hearing in
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support thereof the affidavits of the witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, and if time is required by the defendant to procure such affidavits, the court may postpone the hearing
of the motion for such length of time as under all the circumstances of the case may seem reasonable."

As can be seen from the statutory requirements, in order to
allow a motion for newly discovered evidence, it must appear that the evidence was material and could not have
been obtained with reasonable diligence at the time of trial.
Further, the statute specifically requires that any claim of
newly discovered evidence be set down in affidavit form.
In the insant case the appellant offered two letters, one
from a psychologist, and one from a medical doctor. Neither
of these letters are in affidavit form. This, in and of itself,
would have been sufficient grounds to warrant the denial of
the motion for new trial. In addition, it is submitted that
there are numerous other reasons upon which the court
could properly have based its decision in denying the appellant's motion.
InStatev. Weaver, 78Utah555,6P.2d 167 (1931),this
court noted :
"Newly discovered evidence, to be ground for a new trial, must
satisfy several elementary requirements. The courts are not in
accord respecting all these requirements, but fairly agree that the
newly discovered evidence be such as could not with reasonable
diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial, that it
be not merely cumulative, and that it be such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the case."

In State v. Moore, 41 Utah 247 (1912), this court
denied an appellant's claim that a new trial should have
been granted based upon newly discovered evidence where
it was clear that with reasonable diligence the evidence
could have been ascertained at the time of trial.
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In State l'. At ontgomery, 37 Utah 515, 109 Pac. 815
( 191 0) , this court noted :

"* * *

It is elementary that, in granting or refusing motions for
new trials, a certain amount of discretion is vested in the trial
courts which they alone can exercise.***"

In addition, the court stated that in order for newly discovered evidence to justify a new trial, it must appear that
the evidence was so strong as to have affected the result.
Thus, the court stated:

"* * * In no event, therefore, is this so-called newly discovered evidence 'so conclusive in its character as to raise a reasonable presumption that the result of a second trial would be different from
the first,' which would have to be the case in order to authorize us
to grant a new trial. * * *"

Applying these rules to the facts of the instant case, it is
clear, first of all, that the appellant did not use due diligence
and, in fact, that the evidence is not newly discovered. The
letter offered to the court dated May 20, 1963, from Dr.
Parmalee, expressly notes that the original examination of
the appellant was made on December 26, 1962 at the request of the appellant's attorney who represented the appellant in the instant case up until a few days before trial.
Consequently, the evidence was well known to counsel representing the appellant long before trial. The letter to
Judge Foley from Dr. Parmalee, although not a matter of
record, also notes that the appellant's counsel knew of the
psychiatric situation of the appellant. It is obvious that this
is evidence which clearly was known to the appellant, which
one of appellant's counsel was fully aware of, and which
could have been presented at the trial had due diligence
been exercised.
Secondlv, it should be noted that in none of the letters
and materials from the psychiatrist is there any indication
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that the defendant was legally insane within the rules laid
down by this court in State v. Kirkham, 7 U.2d 108, 319
P.2d 859 ( 1957), and State v. Poulson, 14 U.2d 213, 381
P.2d 93 ( 1963). Consequently, it cannot be said that the
evidence offered in support of the motion for new trial was
of such a conclusive nature that the result would have been
different. Indeed, the letters make little reference to the
crime in question and generally are not directed to the question of whether or not the defendant was legally sane or insane at the time of the commission of the offense.
Finally, it should be noted that since the appellant filed
no notice of an intention to raise the defense of insanity, and
apparently did so fully realizing his previous psychiatric history, as did counsel who then represented the appellant,
there would be no basis to warrant a new trial since the
appellant, having notice of the possible defense, waived it.
It is submitted, therefore, that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for
new trial.
CONCLUSION
The issues raised by the appellant in support of relief
from this court clearly show that he is both procedurally
and substantively without remedy. As a consequence, this
court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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